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Abstract
Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This 
paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: they are under-
ived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all 
possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived in-
tentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also 
address objections which touch on a range of topics, including meaning holism, concept em-
piricism, and the relation between introspection and phenomenal consciousness. I conclude 
with a brief discussion of the consequences of the proposed theory for the project of naturaliz-
ing consciousness. 
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1. Introduction
Philosophers commonly distinguish between two kinds of mental state: intentional states and 
phenomenal states. The former, such as beliefs and desires, are characterized by their  inten-
tional directedness. Intentional directedness is the property of being directed at objects, states 
of affairs, properties, or other entities independently of the existence or instantiation of these 
entities. Phenomenal states, or experiences, are individuated by what it is like to be in them. 
The paradigmatic examples of phenomenal states are perceptual experiences, bodily sensa-
tions, and emotional feelings. 
Phenomenal states and intentional states might be related in many ways. According to one 
view, representationalism, there is some property F such that the phenomenal states are one 
and the same as the intentional states with this property. Variants on this view have been de-
fended  by  Byrne  (2001),  Dretske  (1995,  2003),  Chalmers  (2004,  2006),  Jackson  (2004), 
Lycan (1996) and Tye (1995, 2000), among others. In this paper I will ask what property F 
might be. 
Perhaps the leading account of property F is Tye's PANIC theory, which he shares in out-
line with Dretske.1 According to this theory, F is the property of being Poised, Abstract, and 
Nonconceptual. Poised states are such that “they arise at the interface of the nonconceptual 
and conceptual domains, and they stand ready and available to make a direct impact on beliefs  
and/or desires” (Tye 2000, p. 62). On Tye's usage, intentional states are abstract when their 
contents are not object-involving. Nonconceptual states are states one can be in without pos-
sessing concepts for the entities that figure in their contents. 
The PANIC theory faces some difficulties. For example, one might reasonably doubt that 
consciousness involves something as vague as poisedness. Thought experiments of the kind 
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discussed by Block (1995) also suggest that it is possible to have experiences which are fully 
disconnected from one's higher cognitive faculties, contrary to the requirement of poisedness.2 
My aim in this paper is to propose an alternative account of the distinguishing property F. 
All representationalists should agree that part of what it takes for an intentional state to be 
conscious is that its intentionality be original or underived. I suggest that we need not add 
anything else to our account of consciousness: the phenomenal states are simply the underived 
intentional states. This proposal captures the spirit of the view Chalmers (2004) calls “pure 
representationalism”, in that it appeals to a minimum of non-representational elements to dis-
tinguish phenomenal and non-phenomenal intentional states. As a reminder of this, I refer to it 
as the PURE theory of experience. The acronym “PURE” stands for Pure Underived Repres-
entational Events, which is what the theory says experiential events are (“pure” means “noth-
ing more than”).
I will begin by explaining the PURE theory in more detail. Then I will give an argument 
for it before turning to the main objections it faces. I will not defend representationalism per 
se, but I will argue that once this view is accepted, the property of being underived can play 
the role of property F. 
2. The PURE theory
The PURE theory says that the phenomenal states are one and the same as the underived in-
tentional states. It is equivalent to the conjunction of two theses. First, the originality thesis:
The originality thesis: all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states. 
The second thesis is the converse, namely, that all possible underived intentional states are 
phenomenal states. We can also put it like this:
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The derivation thesis: all possible non-phenomenal intentional states are derived.
I must now clarify what I mean by “derived” and “underived”. The difference between de-
rived and underived representations is normally glossed as that between those representations 
which are intrinsically representational (the underived ones) and those which are not (the de-
rived ones; c.f. Searle 1983 and Strawson 1994). I take this to mean that what distinguishes 
derived from underived representations is that the former, but not the latter, have their con-
tents or representational properties at least in part in virtue of intentional states distinct from 
themselves, or relations to such states. For example, linguistic representations seem to differ 
from underived mental states in that they have content at least in part in virtue of their users' 
intentional states or relations to their users' intentional states. This is the understanding of the 
derived / underived distinction I will adopt for the purposes of this paper: a representation 
(either a state or an object) is derived just in case it is such that it must be realized at least in 
part by intentional states distinct from itself, or relations to such states. 3 Underived representa-
tions are representations which are not derived. According to the PURE theory, a phenomenal 
state is an underived intentional state, that is, an intentional state which need not be realized 
by any other intentional states or relations to other intentional states. 
The claim that  all  non-phenomenal  intentional  states are derived (the derivation thesis) 
might seem surprising given that the paradigmatic examples of derived representations are 
linguistic. But the derived / underived distinction leaves room for derived mental states. I will 
now survey four different kinds of derived intentionality we might find among mental states. 
This will give more shape to the PURE theory and help make sense of the derivation thesis. 
At this stage, however, I am not trying to argue for the latter thesis, but only to give the reader 
a sense of the various ways the PURE theory could be developed, some of which I will pursue 
later in the paper. 
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(1)  Deferential derivation.  Some mental states might get their contents from the mental 
states of members of linguistic communities in the same kind of way as linguistic representa-
tions. Take a child who is learning to speak. If she said, sincerely, “the barrister wasn't nice to 
daddy”, she could plausibly be described as believing that the barrister was not nice to her 
father. This would be so even if she had a very imperfect command of the meaning of “barris-
ter”. In such a case it would seem that the contents of her speech act and the thought she ex-
pressed derived from the linguistic conventions by which she was bound. They would there-
fore seem to be ultimately derived from others' mental states. It may be that many of the con-
tents we express and believe derive in part from others' mental states in this way. This appears 
to be the upshot of Burge's (1979) anti-individualism and Putnam's (1975) argument for the 
division of linguistic labor. 
(2) Compositional derivation. Perhaps the most easily recognized kind of derived inten-
tionality is that of composite states. Take the state of experiencing-redness-while-believ-
ing-that-P (for some P). This is arguably an intentional state: it has intentional directedness at 
least toward P. But it must be realized by a belief and an experience in order to be instantiated.  
This means that it is derived. It is derived in virtue of having other intentional states as com-
ponents.4 
(3) Dispositional derivation. Another way some intentional states might derive from others 
is through causal connections. The best examples here are non-occurrent states—states which 
involve no mental “goings-on”. Arguably, almost all belief ascriptions are ascriptions of non-
occurrent states. For example, it could be true of me at a given time that I believe monkeys 
like bananas even though I am deep asleep and have nothing “on my mind”. Moreover, non-
occurrent states seem to be constituted at least in part by dispositions to have relevant occur-
rent states. We would not say that I believe monkeys like bananas if I were not disposed to 
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think (occurrently, with a certain conviction) that monkeys like bananas upon being suitably 
prompted in the right conditions. It is on the face of it at least in part in virtue of my disposi-
tion to token relevant occurrent states that I count (while asleep) as believing that monkeys 
like bananas. If this observation extends to all non-occurrent states, then non-occurrent states 
merely have derived intentionality. 
(4) Matching derivation. A fourth, potentially more controversial kind of derived intention-
ality is best brought out by means of the distinction between wide and narrow content drawn 
by Chalmers (2002a), Jackson (2003), Loar (1987), Segal (2000), and many others. To illus-
trate the distinction, take a typical token s of the sentence “Water is H2O”. According to the 
preceding theorists, s has two contents, one wide and one narrow. Its wide content is the trivi-
al proposition H2O is H2O, while its narrow content for an average individual might be a de-
scriptive proposition of the form the actual watery stuff is the stuff scientists call “H2O” in 
this world, a relation between clusters of properties, or some such. The wide content of  s, 
which depends on factors external to the speaker's brain, accounts for the fact that it is neces-
sarily true. By contrast, its narrow content is determined by the state of the speaker's brain and 
might account for the fact that it appears cognitively significant or a posteriori. The details of 
this view vary from one author to the next, but a common thread is that the narrow content of  
a representation at least partly determines its wide content through something like descriptive 
matching. For example, one might say that the term “water” has H2O as wide content at least 
in part in virtue of the fact that the latter matches the properties figuring in its narrow content. 
The same could be true of mental states: perhaps thoughts with H2O content have it in part in 
virtue of other thoughts having watery stuff content. The former would be matching states and 
the latter matched states; the former would be derived, while the latter could be either derived 
or underived.5 
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Let us take stock. There are many ways intentional states could derive from one another 
(realize one another), but four possible derivation mechanisms are salient: derivation through 
deference, composition, dispositions, and matching. I suggest that the phenomenal states are 
precisely the underived intentional states, that is, the intentional states which need not be de-
rived in any of these ways, or any other. 
3. Argument
In this section I argue for the originality and derivation theses I introduced at the beginning of 
the preceding section. These theses together entail that, necessarily, all and only phenomenal 
states are underived intentional states (the PURE theory). 
3.1. The originality thesis: all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional 
states
The originality thesis can be factored into two claims: first, that all possible phenomenal states  
are intentional states; second that all possible phenomenal states are underived if intentional. I 
will not argue for the first claim here. It is a central tenet of representationalism. As I said in 
introduction, I take this view as background assumption for present purposes. I will focus on 
the claim that phenomenal states are underived. 
It seems plausible that any sensory experience could in principle occur in isolation from all 
other intentional states. Take for example my current experience of the whiteness of my com-
puter's screen (call it e). On the face of it, a being could pop into existence, have a token of e 
for a split second, then disappear without having had any other intentional states or stood in 
any nontrivial relations to other intentional states. The cogency of this scenario is at  least 
good evidence of its metaphysical possibility. It therefore seems that a token of e could occur 
without being realized by distinct states or relations to distinct states. Now, an underived state 
is a state whose tokens need not be realized by distinct states or relations to such states. It fol-
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lows that e is underived. Since this reasoning straightforwardly extends to other sensory ex-
periences (experiences of sounds, shapes, smells, etc), it seems probable that sensory experi-
ences are underived. 
This reasoning also appears to carry over to non-sensory experiences, e.g., the tip-of-the-
tongue feeling, the feeling of confusion, the experience of familiarity, the experience of an af-
fordance,  and the  experience  of  causation.  Take causation.  Assuming one can experience 
causal  relations,  it  seems possible  to  be phenomenally conscious merely as  of  something 
causing  something  without  undergoing  other  experiences  or  having  any  other  intentional 
states. One might describe such an experience as a vague feeling that something is happening, 
that a force was exerted, or some such. It therefore seems that any phenomenal state could oc-
cur in isolation from any other intentional states, hence that all possible phenomenal states are 
underived. 
In case one is suspicious of  a priori assessments of metaphysical possibility, there is a 
largely empirical line of argument to the same conclusion. It is well known that human brains 
are far more similar to the brains of other species at the level of perceptual systems than at the 
level of cognitive systems. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect there to be creatures cap-
able of sensory experiences similar to ours even though they have almost none of the cognit-
ive capabilities we have (perhaps some birds, some fishes, or some dim mammals are like 
that). This would strongly suggest that sensory experiences can occur without thoughts. The 
fact that sensory experience is largely independent of influence from background beliefs (as 
cases of familiar perceptual illusions show) likewise suggests that sensory experience is inde-
pendent of thought. 
There are also empirical reasons to think that sensory experiences are independent  from 
one another. For a start, our sensory modalities are largely modular: some people can see but 
8 / 40
not hear, others can smell but not see, touch but not smell, and so on. Pathological cases fur-
ther show that there is a great deal of modularity  within sensory modalities. For example, 
achromats can see shapes but not colors. Cases of visual agnosia provide more striking ex-
amples of how aspects of visual experience can come apart. For instance, some individuals 
who suffer from visual form agnosia can recognize movement but not discriminate shapes 
(Farah 1990, p. 12). Others who are afflicted with dorsal simultanagnosia can see certain ob-
jects' individual features without being able to grasp them as wholes, and some lack the ability  
to visually recognize the presence of more than one object at a time (to experience numerical 
distinctness; Farah 1990, pp. 27-8). Farah discusses many other kinds of agnosia. These cases, 
along with functional  imaging experiments and single-cell  recordings,  show that vision is 
highly modularized (Cooney & Gazzaniga 2003).  Of course,  they do not demonstrate  the 
metaphysical possibility of any sensory experience occurring independently of all others; no 
amount of empirical data can show this. Nevertheless, the fact that sensory experiences are by 
and large nomically dissociable from one another suggests that one could in principle have 
any sensory experience in isolation from all other possible sensory experiences. Given that 
sensory experiences are also independent from thoughts, it is tempting to conclude that any 
sensory experience could in principle occur in isolation from all  other possible intentional 
states. It would then follow that sensory experience is underived. 
It remains to see if there is also empirical evidence that non-sensory experience is under-
ived. To continue with the example of causation, we have at least two relevant pieces of em-
pirical evidence regarding the relation between experiences of causation and other experi-
ences: 1) it is in practice possible to experience causation without experiencing familiarity, af-
fordances, or having any other non-sensory experiences; 2) the sensory experiences which ac-
company experiences of causation vary greatly from case to case. These two facts together 
suggest that experiences of causation could in principle occur in isolation from any other ex-
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periences. Now, it also seems possible in practice to experience causation without having any 
relevant thoughts. For example, suppose that I am unintentionally kicking small stones as I 
am walking down a gravel path. I could in practice be dimly aware of this fact and have a cer-
tain feeling of causing change in my environment without having any potentially relevant 
thoughts, or even dispositions to have relevant thoughts. This suggests that I could in prin-
ciple experience causation without having any thoughts at all. Given that I can in principle 
also experience causation without having any other experiences, it is reasonable to conclude 
that one could in principle experience causation without tokening any other intentional states. 
This would mean that experiences of causation are underived. This argument appears to gen-
eralize to other non-sensory experiences. Since we have already seen that sensory experiences 
are probably underived, it seems likely that all experiences, either sensory or non-sensory, are 
underived. 
To summarize, there are two sources of evidence for the originality thesis: modal intuition 
and empirical data. Both suggest that any experience could in principle occur in complete 
isolation from all other possible intentional states.6 If this conclusion is correct, all phenomen-
al states are underived, because it is sufficient for a state to be underived that it be possible for 
it to occur without being realized by distinct intentional states. 
A natural objection to the originality thesis stems from the view that “experience is concep-
tual”. This view suggests that the content of experience derives from concepts. However, it 
does not entail that experiences derive from other intentional states, so it is compatible with 
the originality thesis.
There are two different interpretations of the claim that “experience is conceptual” (see 
Heck 2000). On the content view, a state is conceptual just in case its object (its content) is an 
entity of a special kind, e.g., a Fregean sense. On the state view, a state is conceptual when it 
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is of necessity realized by (or dependent on7) representational vehicles of a special kind, e.g. a 
special sort of term in the language of thought. It is true on each view that conceptual states 
“involve concepts”. However, this claim and the term “concept” take different meanings de-
pending on what being conceptual is supposed to amount to. On the content view, conceptual 
states involve concepts in that they represent concepts (contents of a special kind); on the state 
view, they involve concepts in that they are realized by concepts (representational vehicles of 
a special kind). 
The content view is compatible with the originality thesis. On the face of it, at least, there 
is no reason to think that a state whose content involves something like a Fregean sense has to 
be realized by distinct states. Regarding the state view, the mere fact that experiences are real-
ized by special representational vehicles does not conflict with the originality thesis. It would 
conflict only if concepts were themselves intentional states, which they are not (they are mere 
vehicles). Now, one might think that concepts derive their contents from relations to thoughts, 
i.e. from their conceptual roles. The state view combined with a conceptual role semantics for 
the concepts relevant to experience would conflict with the originality thesis. But a theory of 
content according to which the relevant concepts get their contents solely through causal rela-
tions with their objects would not have this consequence. By itself, the state view is compat-
ible with the originality thesis. More importantly, conceptual role semantics does not seem 
plausible as a theory of the contents of experience (see §4.3 below). 
3.2. The derivation thesis: all possible non-phenomenal intentional states are derived
The derivation thesis is a weakened version of the following claim: 
The strong derivation thesis: all possible non-phenomenal intentional states derive 
from phenomenal states. 
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A number of authors have recently expressed sympathy for the strong derivation thesis (e.g., 
Graham, Horgan & Tienson 2007; Kriegel 2003; McGinn 1988; Searle 1990 ,1992; Strawson 
1994). It has also been widely held during the past few hundred years: British empiricists 
were explicitly committed to it; Kant famously held that concepts without intuition are blind, 
which can at least be read as suggesting a similar thesis; Brentano described mental states as 
“presentations” (experiences)  and states “dependent on presentations”8;  Russell  appears to 
have been committed to some kind of derivation thesis given that his notion of acquaintance is  
akin to our notion of consciousness.9 These authors have offered a range of reasons for hold-
ing the strong derivation thesis, and these reasons all carry over to the weaker derivation thes-
is.
Here, however, I want to give an argument for the (weak) derivation thesis which does not 
rely on the strong derivation thesis. The argument goes as follows: 
P1. Every possible underived intentional state is either an attitude or a phenomenal 
state.
P2. Every possible attitude is derived.
Therefore, every possible underived intentional state is a phenomenal state. 
The  conclusion  of  this  argument  is  equivalent  to  the  derivation  thesis  (all  possible  non-
phenomenal intentional states are derived). I will begin by explaining what I mean by “atti-
tude”. Then I will say why I find P1 and P2 plausible. 
All attitudes are directed at entities of some kind or other. Perhaps the most commonly dis-
cussed objects of attitudes are propositions. An attitude toward a proposition is what we call a 
propositional attitude. The paradigmatic examples of propositional attitudes are belief and de-
sire, but propositional attitudes are far more diverse than this. Examples of propositional atti-
tudes include: wondering whether P, rejecting the claim that P, suspecting that P, entertaining 
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the possibility that P, being intrigued by the fact that P, assuming that P, wishing that P, being 
frustrated by the fact that P, being ashamed that P, being anxious that P, being afraid that P, be-
ing thrilled that P, intending to make it so that P.
Other attitudes are directed at objects or properties rather than propositions. Examples of 
such sub-propositional attitudes include believing someone, being inquisitive about someone, 
being puzzled  by an object,  ignoring  someone,  liking something,  loving someone,  hating 
someone, fearing something, wanting something, admiring someone, etc. It is arguable that 
sub-propositional attitudes are very often derivative on propositional attitudes. For instance, I 
fear Rufus at least in part in virtue of the fact that I fear being bitten by him (that I will be bit-
ten by him). 
By “attitudes”, I mean states of the most specific natural kind that includes all the preced-
ing examples. This kind of state appears to be characterized by three features. First, states of 
this kind are attitudes in the ordinary sense: they are attitudes in the same sense that being 
cheerful and being arrogant are attitudes (they are “ways of being”). Second, they have a kind 
of directedness (which cheerfulness and arrogance arguably lack). Third, they are intentional. 
This is to say that the sort of directedness they involve can obtain even if the entities they are  
directed toward do not exist, are not instantiated, or do not obtain (depending on what kind of 
entity they are). I will say more about the nature of attitudes as we progress. 
The first premise of my argument for derivation (P1) is that every possible underived in-
tentional state is either an attitude or a phenomenal state. This might seem to be true simply in 
virtue of the fact that every intentional state (whether derived or underived) is either an atti-
tude or a phenomenal state. However, it is important that we allow derived states which are 
neither attitudes nor phenomenal states in order to account for composite states of the kind I 
mentioned in §2. For example, one might count the state of doubting-some-content-one-is-ex-
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periencing as an intentional state. It involves more than an attitude and more than a phenom-
enal state. This means that it is neither a phenomenal state nor an attitude. However, it is a de-
rived state, because it must be realized by an attitude and a phenomenal state. The occurrence 
of “underived” in P1 is there to accommodate such composite states. P1 seems prima facie 
plausible because all non-composite intentional states appear to be either attitudes or phenom-
enal states. 
In order to see better the plausibility of P1, try to picture Void, a being capable of intention-
al states but constitutively incapable of having experiences or attitudes. Void cannot have any 
beliefs, desires, wishes, fears, pains, feelings, and so forth,  but it has mental states.10 I find 
myself unable to imagine Void as described. As far as I can tell, there is no Void in logical 
space. This is not surprising, because even when we ascribe mental states to machines or other 
simple systems, we ascribe them attitudes and phenomenal states. For example, we say that 
computers believe, learn, and see; that immune systems learn, sense, and want; that flowers 
sense and know things. If personal computers, immune systems, and flowers could not be said 
to have attitudes or experiences—not even metaphorically—we would not even be tempted to 
ascribe them mental states as a façon de parler. Trying to imagine a being which has mental 
states (let alone intentional states) but lacks the capacity to have attitudes or experiences is 
like trying to imagine someone walking without causing anything to move. In absence of 
evidence to the contrary, this is good reason to suppose that all possible mental states either 
are, or are partly constituted by, attitudes or experiences. This in turn would mean that every 
underived intentional state is either an attitude or a phenomenal state. 
One might ask why thinking and entertaining a proposition are not counterexamples to P1. 
“Think” can take two different meanings depending on how it is used. When we say that 
someone thinks that P, we mean that she believes P to be true. For example, I think that we 
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are headed toward a recession. This is to say that I believe we are headed toward a recession. 
Thinking is in this sense an attitude, because believing is an attitude. We can use “think” in a 
different sense, as when we say that someone is thinking about the fact that P. Here “think” is 
used to mean that one is engaged in some kind of mental process involving representations of 
certain contents. One may or may not count the process of thinking as a mental state. If it is 
counted as a (temporally structured) state, it is a derived one, because a reasoning process is 
of necessity realized by the states it connects. If thinking in the present sense is not a state,  
then it falls outside the scope of P1, which bears only on intentional  states. Either way, no 
case of thinking about a content contradicts P1. “Entertain” means something similar to “think  
about”. When we say that someone is entertaining a claim or possibility, we mean that she is 
engaged in some kind of exploration of its plausibility or relevance. Entertaining a proposition  
is a process which could be classified either as not a state or as a temporally structured, de-
rived state. 
I now turn to the claim that all possible attitudes are derived (P2). At this stage we need to 
ask in virtue of what we have beliefs, desires, and other attitudes. This is of course a difficult  
question. Fortunately, we need not provide a full answer to it; we need not commit on neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for attitudes. It is enough for our purposes to ask whether part 
of what it is for a state to be a belief, desire, or attitude of some other kind is for it to stand in 
certain relations to other intentional states (either attitudes or phenomenal states). We might 
call the view according to which this is so minimal functionalism. If minimal functionalism is 
correct, attitudes are realized at least partly by relations to distinct intentional states, so are de-
rived. 
Perhaps the best way to bring out the plausibility of minimal functionalism is to compare 
attitudes with phenomenal states. Phenomenal states are intentional states, but one can experi-
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ence a given content without also having a belief, desire, or any other attitude toward it. Ima-
gine for example that you are looking at a stick which is half immersed in water. Even if your 
experience presented the stick as bent to you, you would not necessarily believe, wish, sup-
pose, desire, or intend it to be bent, or have any other attitude toward its being bent. Alternat -
ively, suppose that you are lying in bed with your eyes closed and a mental image of a beach 
pops in your mind. It does not follow from the fact that you have a phenomenal representation 
of a beach that you have any attitude whatsoever with respect to any beach. Experiences are 
intentional states, but they are not attitudes in the sense I am concerned with (see §4.1 below 
for more on this point).
What is missing from experiences to confer attitudes? In particular, what else would it take 
for you to count as believing that the stick is bent, or as desiring to be at the beach? Disposi -
tions to behave (move) in certain ways would seem insufficient.  For not believing that P 
seems entirely consistent with experiencing P and having exactly the behavioral dispositions 
of someone who believes that P. It is a familiar point that the very same behavioral disposi-
tions can be explained just as well by mutually exclusive sets of attitudes, e.g., a set involving 
the belief that P and other attitudes, and a set involving the belief that not-P among other atti-
tudes. This is so quite independently of whether one represents P consciously or not. But if 
behavioral dispositions would not be sufficient for you to believe that the stick is bent or de-
sire being at the beach, what is missing has to be other mental states or dispositions to token 
other mental states. Perhaps you would have to feel or be disposed to feel certain things—a 
certain conviction for belief, a certain pull for desire. Or perhaps what you would need is dis-
positions to token attitudes consistent with believing that the stick is bent or desiring to be at 
the beach. Or one might think that either dispositions to have relevant feelings or dispositions 
to token relevant attitudes would do it. 
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Whatever the case may be, the preceding examples bring out the fact that believing and de-
siring are attitudes  in the ordinary sense of “attitude”.  Your beliefs and desires are not just 
static representations in your brain. They also involve (if they are not exhausted by) complex 
dispositions to token certain patterns of mental states (phenomenal states and other attitudes). 
As such, attitudes are parasitic on the states they connect. Hence minimal functionalism and 
the derived status of attitudes. 
It is worth emphasizing how weak minimal functionalism is. Since it only implies that cer-
tain relations to distinct intentional states are partly constitutive of attitudes, it is not open to 
objections to functionalism which purport to show that functional role is insufficient for atti-
tudes. For example, it is not open to Searle's (1980) Chinese room and Block's (1978) China 
brain objections. It is also not open to Galen Strawson's (1994) Weather Watcher argument 
against “neobehaviorism”, because it does not draw any necessary connection between mental 
states and behavior. In fact, Strawson appears to endorse a form of minimal functionalism, at 
least as far as the attitude of desire goes:
… the primary linkage of the notion of desire to a notion other than itself is not to the 
notion of action or behaviour but rather to the notion of being pleased or happy or con-
tented should something come about ... (p. 280)
Strawson implies that it is part of a state's being one of desire that its owner be disposed to 
token a certain kind of phenomenal state or attitude were it to be satisfied. This is a variant on 
minimal functionalism about desire. 
Strawson is not the only one with sympathies for minimal functionalism. It is part of the 
full-blown  functionalist  view  of  attitudes,  whose  proponents  are  many,  e.g.,  Armstrong 
(1973),  Audi  (1972),  Baker  (1995),  Fodor  (1990),  Harman  (1973),  Lycan  (1982),  Pettit 
(1993), and Stalnaker (1984), to name a few. Dennett's (1987) and Davidson's (1984) brands 
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of interpretationism also involve a minimal functionalist element. Likewise, the teleosemantic 
theory defended by Millikan (1984) entails that attitudes are constituted in part by relations to 
distinct intentional states (they must form systems of “intentional icons”). As far as I can tell, 
almost all mainstream theories of propositional attitudes embody a form of minimal function-
alism. 
One might question my claim that functionalism (either full or minimal) entails that atti-
tudes are derived. For take a standard wide functionalist view according to which attitudes are 
states that stand in certain causal relations to other mental states and external entities. One 
way to state such a view about belief would be to say that to have a belief is to be in a state s 
such that there are other states and entities t, u, v, ... such that s stands in a complex causal re-
lation  R to the latter.  The right  hand side of this  identification is  couched in non-mental 
vocabulary. It might therefore seem that what realizes beliefs on the functionalist view are 
mere patterns of neutrally characterizable states, not relations to other mental states. If this 
were so, functionalism would not entail that attitudes are derived. Since minimal functional-
ism is strictly weaker than functionalism, this would show also that the former does not entail  
that attitudes are derived. 
I agree that belief can be identified with a neutrally characterizable state on the standard 
functionalist view, but it remains that this state is constituted by relations to states which are,  
in light of the same view, distinct intentional states. It matters not what kind of vocabulary the 
relevant states can be described in. It is enough for a state to be derived that it be of necessity  
realized by relations to distinct intentional states, so attitudes are derived on the functionalist 
view. Note also that the objection proves too much: if being of necessity realized by relations 
to states of a certain type S were insufficient to be derived when the S states are reducible to 
pure functional states, then functionalism would have the consequence that linguistic repres-
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entations are underived. 
This concludes my argument for the derivation thesis and the PURE theory. The overall ar-
gument is relatively straightforward. First, our rational ability to assess metaphysical possibil-
ity  a priori, combined with relevant empirical facts, provides significant evidence that phe-
nomenal states are underived (the originality thesis). Second, intentional states appear to fall 
into three categories: phenomenal states, attitudes, and composite (derived) states. Minimal 
functionalism, an intrinsically plausible and widely held view, tells us that attitudes are para-
sitic on other states (that they are derived). It follows that non-phenomenal states are derived 
(the derivation thesis).  We therefore have at our disposal a simple yet largely reductive ac-
count of what distinguishes phenomenal states from other intentional states: all and only phe-
nomenal states are underived. We need not appeal to unwieldy notions such as poisedness and 
nonconceptualness in order to explain consciousness, because consciousness is simply under-
ived intentionality. 
4. Objections
4.1 Phenomenal attitudes
One might think that some attitudes are also phenomenal states. Let us call an attitude which 
is also a phenomenal state a phenomenal attitude. If there were phenomenal attitudes, it would 
follow from the originality thesis that they are underived. But I claimed as part of my argu-
ment for the derivation thesis that all attitudes are derived (P2). Either there are no phenomen-
al attitudes, the originality thesis is false, or my argument for derivation is unsound.11 Let us 
look into the main reasons why one might think there are phenomenal attitudes. 
Representationalism is sometimes described as the view that phenomenal states are a spe-
cial class of attitudes (c.f., Crane 2003, Jackson 2004). On this reading, representationalism 
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commits one to phenomenal attitudes. But the representationalist view stated in introduction 
only entails that phenomenal states are intentional states. Whether it follows from this that 
phenomenal states are attitudes depends on whether all intentional states are attitudes. Here 
we run into terminological difficulties. It seems to me that those who identify phenomenal 
states with a special class of “attitudes” are using the term “attitude” in a sense different from 
mine. Take Crane (2003), for example. On his usage, a propositional attitude is a state of be-
ing related through an “intentional mode” to a content. Crane does not say explicitly what in-
tentional modes are, but he counts sensing painfully as an intentional mode. It seems that an 
intentional mode is nothing more than a mental relation involving intentional directedness. 
Attitudes would in this sense encompass all intentional states in my sense. But they are not 
obviously the same as attitudes in my sense. Remember that an attitude in my sense is a state 
of the most specific natural kind that encompasses all the examples I gave in §3.1, which in-
clude no experiences. It is plausible that attitudes in this sense constitute a narrower category 
than what I call “intentional states” and Crane refers to as “attitudes”. This possibility is at  
least not ruled out a priori. As a result, it does not seem that representationalism commits us 
to phenomenal attitudes (in my sense of “attitude”). 
Now, one might think that there are phenomenal attitudes even if representationalism does 
not commit us to their existence. Arguably the best potential examples of phenomenal states 
which are also attitudes are felt urges. Suppose for instance that I felt a strong urge to eat a 
piece of black forest cake someone put in front of me. This feeling would be a phenomenal 
state. It might also seem to be a kind of attitude—a desire-like attitude. Felt urges might there -
fore seem to be phenomenal attitudes. Similarly, one might think that a perceptual experience 
accompanied by a certain feeling of conviction ought to count as a belief-like phenomenal at-
titude. 
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Against this, imagine that I felt an urge to eat the cake but had no corresponding cognitive 
or behavioral dispositions: though I felt an urge to eat the cake, I gave strong nonverbal signs 
of loathing it, asked the person next to me if she would not want my share, and was pro-
foundly relieved I would not have to suffer its sweetness when she accepted it. The natural 
thing to say in this case would be that I momentarily felt as if I wanted the cake but did not 
really want it. The same is true of belief-like attitudes and the feelings which sometimes ac-
company them. For instance, a claim can momentarily feel right to you without your believing  
it. One can momentarily feel as if one believed something without really believing it. This 
suggests that feelings are not attitudes, but merely normal concomitants of attitudes. 
It is worth noting also that the present difficulties can be avoided without denying the ex-
istence of phenomenal attitudes. We need simply change P2 for the claim that non-phenomen-
al attitudes are derived. This would make it compatible with the originality thesis and the ex-
istence of phenomenal attitudes. Moreover, the derivation thesis would still follow from this 
weakened premise and P1: if every underived intentional state is either an attitude or a phe-
nomenal state and every non-phenomenal attitude is derived, every underived intentional state 
is a phenomenal state. I don't think any phenomenal state is properly counted as an attitude, 
but one could allow this at little cost to the PURE theory. 
4.2 Emotions
Emotional feelings such as the feelings of joy and fear are paradigmatic phenomenal states. 
So the PURE theory implies that they are underived. But (as an anonymous referee notes) it is 
a common view that the intentionality of emotions derives from that of related beliefs, desires,  
or other propositional attitudes. This kind of cognitivist view might seem to conflict with the 
originality thesis for emotional feelings.
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Here it is important to distinguish between emotional feelings and other, more complex 
emotional states. I reserve the term “emotional feeling” for the phenomenal states associated 
with emotions. Most authors agree that emotional states generally go beyond emotional feel-
ings (see de Sousa, 2007). Perhaps the best examples of emotional states which involve more 
than emotional feelings (more than phenomenal experiences) are love and hate, two paradig-
matic emotional states. These states, or their full-blown variants at least, have  aspects which 
cannot be reduced to pure phenomenal experience. For instance, one might reasonably think 
that certain cognitive dispositions are essential to loving or hating someone. I will call “com-
plex emotions” the emotional states such as love and hate which go beyond emotional feel-
ings. I suspect that most states we consider emotional fall in the category of complex emo-
tions, not emotional feelings. It is complex emotions which generally interest us most in the-
oretical discussions as in everyday life. 
Now, the sort of cognitivist view alluded to above is not as plausible when applied to emo-
tional feelings as it is when applied to complex emotions. It seems plausible that complex 
emotions derive in part from relations they stand into with distinct attitudes. On the other 
hand, emotional feelings seem independent of attitudes for reasons parallel to the considera-
tions I offered in defence of the originality thesis in sections 3.1 and 4.1: it seems that a being 
could in principle have any emotional feeling without having any attitudes or distinct inten-
tional states, or dispositions to token such states. It therefore seems that only complex emo-
tions derive their intentionality from distinct attitudes. Complex emotions are not phenomenal 
states because they are not individuated merely by what it is like to have them, so this minor 
restriction to the cognitivist view makes it compatible with the PURE theory.
4.3. Meaning holism
Meaning holism may be glossed roughly as the view that mental representations necessarily 
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come in large packages.  Given that experiences are  mental representations,  someone who 
holds this could be inclined to think that they are derived.12 This objection to the originality 
thesis might seem particularly pressing in light of my appeal to minimal functionalism, which 
appears close to meaning holism. 
My first response to this objection is that the well-known arguments for meaning holism do 
not even purport to be arguments for holism about the contents of phenomenal states. All ar-
guments for meaning holism are in fact arguments for attitude holism. They might have been 
glossed as or taken to be arguments for holism about semantics, intentionality, or representa-
tion generally by Block (1993), Davidson (1984), Lewis (1974), and Searle (1983), but it is 
striking that none of these philosophers thinks of experiences as intrinsically representational. 
As far as I know, no one has put forward an argument intended to show that the contents of 
experience are holistic.13 To put the point differently, the name “meaning holism” appears to 
be a leftover from the days when we thought of consciousness on the model of contentless 
raw feels. 
Besides the lack of an argument purporting to show that experiences are holistic, it seems 
clear that extant arguments for attitude holism do not apply to experiences. Here I will limit 
myself to what appears to be the two main lines of argument for holism. 
The first is that of Davidson and Lewis, which takes its starting point from the view that 
“certain [holistic] principles of charity are constitutive of content ascription” (Fodor & Lepore 
1992, p. 59). The minimal functionalism about attitudes I briefly defended above has some af-
finities with this claim, in that it portrays attitudes as essentially involving broadly speaking 
rational connections between mental states. However, experiences differ from attitudes in this 
regard: it does not seem that an experience's content depends on how it fits within one's ra-
tional economy over time. Take for example Flashman, a Swampman who survives only long 
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enough to have a few experiences. Flashman might perhaps be incapable of attitudes because 
he cannot be charitably interpreted as having any. But most would balk at the suggestion that 
it is metaphysically impossible for Flashman to have experiences. This illustrates the fact that 
the relevance of charity ends at the boundary between attitudes and phenomenal states. 
Perhaps the main motivation for holism is conceptual role semantics, which is at least non-
atomistic by design. Whether this line of argument extends to phenomenal states or not de-
pends on whether it is plausible that the content of an experience is determined by its inferen-
tial role. But the richness of experience gives us reason to think that inferential role does not 
determine its contents. Take for example the total, unified visual experience I have of my of-
fice at this time (call it o). Millions of different shades and even more small surfaces figure in 
the content of o. Now take an experience o' which is just like o except that its content repres-
ents the top-left most perceptible point on the copy of Hume's Treatise two meters away from 
me as being of a slightly different shade of purple. I doubt that one's inferential dispositions 
with regard to experiences such as  o and o' are always different. In the same vein, cases of 
change blindness with respect to striking features of objects of attention seem to show that 
some differences in phenomenology (even quite stark ones) sometimes fail to be reflected in 
the connections phenomenal states stand in with other states (see Levin et al 2002 for some 
relevant cases).14 
Let me emphasize that I do not wish to criticize holism, Davidsonian charity, or conceptual 
role semantics as far as their applicability to attitudes goes. I am happy to grant that meaning 
holism and the views which support it apply to attitudes—they provide more evidence for 
minimal functionalism. However, I believe that an important difference between attitudes and 
experiences is reflected in the fact that these views seem applicable to the former but not to 
the latter. 
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4.4. The objection from blindness
It is tempting to suppose that derived states ultimately derive from underived states; otherwise 
we would have to contend with infinite or circular derivation chains. So the (weak) derivation 
thesis I argued for leads naturally to the strong derivation thesis I mentioned at the beginning 
of §3.2. It might also seem plausible that derived states must ultimately derive from underived 
states with the same contents. More specifically, one might think that, given the PURE theory, 
non-phenomenal  states  which  share  content  with experiences  should  derive their  contents 
from these experiences. However, this leads to an objection: congenitally blind people are 
able to think about colors like everyone else even though they have no color experiences to 
derive the contents of their color thoughts from; where do they get these contents from? 
My view is that blind people's color thoughts are either deferential or matching states (or 
both). Note first that those who are incapable of experiencing colors (either in perception or in 
imagination) seem to be missing something in the neighborhood of cognitive representational 
abilities. Here for example is what Knut Nordby, a complete achromat, reports: 
Although I have acquired a thorough theoretical knowledge of the physics of colours 
and the physiology of the colour receptor mechanisms, nothing of this can help me to 
understand the true nature of colours. From the history of art I have also learned about 
the meanings often attributed to colours and how colours have been used at different 
times, but this too does not give me an understanding of the essential character or 
quality of colours. (Nordby 1990) 
Nordby claims to be lacking a full grasp of the nature of colors. I am inclined to believe 
him because when I want to form as good an idea as I can of a color, I look for a sample or 
engage in imagery. Since he can neither see nor visualize colors, Nordby is unable to use the 
method which seems to give me the best grasp I can have of them. He must be missing some-
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thing. 
To see more precisely what it is that an achromat or blind person is incapable of, consider  
the following scenario. Bob has been blind from birth and so has never had the ability to ex-
perience color (not even in imagination). One day, a cosmic accident occurs that has two un-
fortunate consequences. The first consequence is that the colors of objects become perman-
ently inverted all over the world. The second is that Bob is knocked into a deep sleep for sev-
eral weeks. During this time, an international convention takes place at which it is decided 
that the meanings of color terms would henceforth be inverted (so that one can again say truly 
that ripe bananas are “yellow”). It takes some adjustment, but by the time Bob wakes up 
everyone has adapted to the new linguistic conventions. Several years down the road, but be-
fore he has realized that naming conventions for colors have changed, Bob gets into an argu-
ment with Alice about the color of the walls in his mother's dining room. He thinks he remem-
bers recently hearing the walls described as “pink”. As a result, he expresses his view on the 
matter as follows:
Bob: The walls are pink.
Alice, who is normally sighted, thinks she has a visual memory of the walls being the color 
she describes as “pale green”. 
Alice: No, they are pale green. 
As it happens, the walls used to be pale green but are now pink due to the world-wide color 
inversion. Since the color naming conventions Alice is bound by have also been inverted, she 
is right to say that the walls are “pale green”. This seems to be a situation in which she is right 
and Bob is wrong. 
Had naming conventions not been changed or colors not been inverted (but not both), Bob 
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would have been right. This suggests that his color thoughts have their contents in part in vir-
tue of deference or descriptive matching. For example, his belief that the color green is com-
mon in nature might be derived from a distinct thought with a content of the form the color 
actually called “green” is common in nature or the actual color of cucumbers is common in  
nature (these examples are of course simplistic). Alternatively, it could get its content directly 
from linguistic conventions and sighted speakers' color thoughts. 
That Bob's color thoughts are derived in one of these ways can be made clearer by con-
trasting his case with that of Chris. Chris is normally sighted. Like Bob, he is knocked into a 
deep sleep by the color-inverting cosmic accident and misses out on the ensuing terminologic-
al reform. To continue the parallel, let us say that Chris fails to notice that colors and color 
naming conventions have been inverted during his absence because he is participating in a 
long-term experiment requiring him to wear contact lenses which make him see everything in 
black and white. He, too, has recently heard the walls of a certain dining room described as 
“pink” and engages in an argument with Alice on this matter. Chris says that the walls are 
“pink”, Alice says that they are “pale green”. Alice does not know that Chris is unaware of the 
new color naming conventions. As a result, she is not trying to adapt the vocabulary she uses 
when talking to him. 
In this case we would expect that Chris and Alice are not really disagreeing but merely us-
ing the terms “pink” and “pale green” differently—we would expect them to be both thinking 
of the walls as pink. This is especially clear given that we would expect them to be both enter-
taining, or ready to entertain, mental images of a pink dining room. Think also about how you 
would intervene in this dispute. Knowing that Chris is normally sighted but unaware of the 
new naming conventions, you would suggest that he and Alice clarify their terminologies first. 
A natural explanation of the difference between Bob and Chris is that Chris, but not Bob, 
27 / 40
has no need for descriptive or deferential referential mechanisms—he grasps the natures of 
colors directly through his ability to token phenomenal representations of them. By contrast, 
Bob merely grasps that they are called certain names and related to objects in certain ways. 
Bob's color thoughts appear to be derived, but not from any states of his with the same con-
tents. 
4.5. Concept empiricism
I mentioned earlier that the weak derivation thesis could reasonably be taken to imply the 
strong derivation thesis (that all non-phenomenal states derive from experiences). This thesis 
might in turn seem to suggest a kind of Humean concept empiricism. To a first approximation,  
Humean concept empiricism is the view that all basic mental representations are simple sens-
ory experiences and all other mental representations derived from those. For example, Hume 
held that “simple ideas” are direct copies of simple sensory impressions and all other ideas 
obtained by some process of combination or association of these primary mental building 
blocks. Some ideas which are not basic on Hume's view are hard to reconstruct from simple 
impressions: for example, those of causation, time, object, and number.15 One might suspect 
that the PURE theory leads to comparable difficulties by way of the strong derivation thesis. 
It is important to be clear on a crucial difference between strong derivation and Humean 
concept empiricism. The latter can be seen as a conjunction of two independent claims: first, 
that all  mental states in some sense derive from experiences;  second, that all experiences 
either are or are composed of simple sensory experiences. The PURE theory might reasonably 
be taken to suggest that all mental states derive from experiences (the first claim), but it is en-
tirely  compatible  with  the existence  of  non-sensory experiences  (which would falsify the 
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second claim). The view suggested by the PURE theory is not Humean concept empiricism 
but one we could call concept experientialism. 
Concept experientialism is arguably far more plausible than Humean concept empiricism. 
For a start, it seems that the class of basic, underived, phenomenally representable concepts is 
significantly larger than the Humean view allows. Crucially, it is plausible that the notions 
Hume had most difficulty reconstructing from sense impressions can be represented phenom-
enally. Take for example causation, time, and persistent objects. There is plausibly something 
it is like to notice a causal relation, be aware of the passage of time, or recognize a persistent 
object as such. Consequently, these notions do not have to be reconstructed from more basic 
ones on the concept experientialist view. 
It is also worth stressing that the PURE theory and concept experientialism are compatible 
with a wide range of derivation mechanisms. For instance, a large number of entities might be 
picked  out  more  or  less  descriptively  through  their  effects  or  linguistic  conventions  (as 
Chalmers 2002b suggests). Other entities might be represented in virtue of inferential connec-
tions between certain states in the kind of way proponents of conceptual role semantics argue 
underpins all conceptual representation (e.g. Block 1986, Harman 1982). Perhaps mental rep-
resentations can also get their contents deferentially without the intermediary of descriptive 
referential mechanisms (as Burge 1979 appears willing to argue). Given the potential ubiquity 
of intentional states which derive their contents through deference, composition, descriptive 
matching, or dispositions, it is plausible that only a small fraction of the contents we can en-
tertain  in  thought  are  ever  underivedly,  phenomenally  represented.  One  might  think  that 
concept experientialism preserves the germ of truth in Hume's first principle. 
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4.6. Unconscious mental states
An important objection to the PURE theory stems from unconscious mental states. It might 
seem obvious if not trivially true that unconscious states are not phenomenal. It might also 
seem probable that some unconscious states are underived intentional states. If both claims 
are true, it follows that some unconscious states are counterexamples to the derivation thesis 
and the PURE theory. 
We need to be careful regarding how we understand the term “unconscious”. If it means 
the same as “non-phenomenal”, then it is trivial that unconscious states are not phenomenal. 
But to say that it is probable that there are unconscious underived intentional states would be 
to say simply that it is probable that there are non-phenomenal underived intentional states. 
The objection would boil down to a mere assertion that the derivation thesis is probably false; 
it would bring in no extra information that could overturn the evidence on the table for deriva-
tion. However, the objection does seem to throw new light on the derivation thesis given an-
other interpretation of the term “unconscious” according to which it means  non-introspect-
ible.  Since the non-introspectible  states  revealed by science are potentially  quite  different 
from ordinary introspectible states (on which I have focused throughout), one might reason-
ably suspect that they make exception to the derivation thesis, or to the premises I relied on in 
my argument for this thesis. 
Putative examples of non-introspectible mental states fall into two broad categories I will 
label subconscious attitudes and unconscious representational states. Subconscious attitudes 
are states of the sort Freud postulated. They are attitudes like belief and desire which are not  
introspectible, or at least not in the normal way. Unconscious representational states are not as 
readily comparable to normal, introspectible states. Prime examples of unconscious represent-
ational states include the states constituted by early representations occurring along visual 
30 / 40
pathways, dorsal stream visual representations, and “implicit” representations of grammatical 
rules. These three kinds of representation play important roles in current psychological theor-
ies, and they are commonly taken to constitute mental states even if they are entirely non-in-
trospectible. One might argue that subconscious attitudes and unconscious representational 
states are counterexamples to the PURE theory because they can be both underived and non-
phenomenal (which would contradict the derivation thesis). 
In  §3.2 I argued that attitudes are derived because they essentially involve cognitive dis-
positions.  The  same  observation  applies  to  subconscious  attitudes,  which  are  even  more 
tightly connected with cognitive dispositions than introspectible attitudes. As a result, subcon-
scious attitudes do not seem to pose a special difficulty at this stage. On the other hand, un-
conscious representational states could reasonably be taken to pose a fresh challenge: it might 
seem obvious that they are not phenomenal states, and it might seem plausible that they are 
underived intentional states because they appear to be neither attitudes nor composite states, 
hence not covered by the argument I gave in §3.2. 
There are three complementary responses to this argument from unconscious representa-
tional states. The first is that it is not obvious that these states are intentional. To count as in-
tentional states, the states constituted by unconscious representations would have to be mental 
states. One could challenge the common assumption that they are. Why should we not say 
simply that they are (non-mental) representational states causally involved in the generation 
of mental states? We do not yet have a well established reductive theory of intentionality. 
Lacking such a theory, we have to determine whether a state is intentional by comparing it 
with the paradigmatic intentional states. The paradigmatic intentional states are attitudes and 
experiences. There seems to be room for one to argue that the similarity between these and the  
bare unconscious information-carrying states postulated by cognitive scientists is too tenuous 
31 / 40
to warrant calling the latter intentional states. 
Another possible response to the objection from unconscious representational states is that, 
if they are intentional, then they are derived (hence compatible with derivation). Imagine the 
following experiment: we extract the early visual system of a mouse, including its eyes, and 
keep it functioning in isolation from the rest of the mouse. Would it seem appropriate to de-
scribe this isolated visual system as having intentional states? Probably not: it would  seem 
farther from having intentional states than today's digital cameras. This suggests that it is at 
best when information-carrying states are suitably integrated within larger perceptual and cog-
nitive systems that they deserve to be described as intentional states. Put differently, it seems 
that unconscious representational states could count as intentional only in virtue of being re-
lated to distinct intentional states in certain ways. This would mean that they are derived if  
they are intentional.
A third response is that, even if we grant that unconscious representational states are under -
ived intentional states, there is no evidence that they are not phenomenal independently of in-
trospectible counterexamples to the PURE theory. To begin with, it is not a priori that non-in-
trospectible states are not phenomenal. For example, it seems perfectly conceivable that some 
animals have experiences but cannot introspect them for lack of introspective capabilities. 
This seems to be not only conceivable but actually true. It is doubtful that mice, for instance,  
can introspect their experiences. The common supposition that all phenomenal states are in-
trospectible is also not supported by direct observation. Of course, all directly observable phe-
nomenal states are introspectible. But this follows simply from the fact that we have no other 
way of observing mental states than through introspection. Normally, it is reasonable to con-
clude that all Fs are Gs from the fact that all observable Fs are Gs. But it would not be reason-
able to infer that all Fs are observable from the fact that all observable Fs are observable. I 
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venture to say that a similar fallacy is behind much of the seeming plausibility of the claim 
that all experiences are introspectible.16
If the claim that all phenomenal states are introspectible is not supported by a priori reas -
oning or direct observation, it can only be supported by theoretical considerations: what we 
should say about non-introspectible states is simply what our best (most empirically adequate, 
simplest,  etc)  theory of consciousness implies about them. So to make a case against  the 
PURE theory based on the claim that non-introspectible states are not phenomenal, one would 
first have to defend a competing theory which shows that non-introspectible states are not 
phenomenal. And one would have to do this based on observations of how introspectible phe-
nomenal and non-phenomenal states relate to physical states. But I have already argued that 
the PURE theory offers the best account of consciousness as far as introspectible states go. 
It is initially hard to believe that our brains might turn out to be replete with experiences 
we cannot introspect. But it is hard to believe that consciousness arises from the brain at all; 
non-introspectible representations do not seem much worse than other bits of the gelatinous 
structure of the brain qua candidate carriers of consciousness. In any case, my point is not that 
there actually are non-introspectible experiences. On the contrary, I recommend agnosticism 
on the matter. I believe that we ought to suspend judgment as to the existence of non-intro-
spectible experiences until we have a well confirmed theory that allows us to settle the ques-
tion. If the PURE theory is correct, we need a theory of underived intentionality before we 
can move forward on this front. The theory of intentionality we end up settling on might have 
the consequence that non-introspectible representational states are no more intentional or con-
scious than thermostats; alternatively, it might imply that each of us harbors far more phenom-
enal states than we ever suspected. The PURE theory by itself is neutral on this score. 
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5. The place of consciousness in nature
I would like to conclude by clarifying the import of the present view for the project of natural -
izing consciousness. 
The PURE theory bears primarily on the place of consciousness in the mind, not on its 
place in nature. It entails that consciousness is reducible if and only if underived intentionality 
is reducible, but it does not dictate whether both are reducible or neither is. It might nonethe-
less seem to have detrimental consequences for naturalization. First, it suggests the strong de-
rivation thesis, which might seem to make consciousness metaphysically or explanatorily pri-
or to intentionality. Second, it implies that phenomenal intentionality is altogether different 
from the (derived) intentionality of propositional attitudes. It might for both reasons seem to 
threaten the hope that representationalism would help the naturalization project by assimilat-
ing experiences to states we already know how to explain, namely, attitudes. Is not the upshot 
of the theory simply that consciousness is the sort of intentionality we cannot reduce?
The implications of the PURE theory for naturalization are not as bleak as the preceding 
might suggest. First, the view does not make consciousness prior to intentionality generally: 
nothing is prior to itself, so consciousness is at least not prior to underived intentionality on 
the PURE view. Regarding the sharp distinction it draws between attitudes and experiences, it 
is true that the theory rules out some accounts of intentionality as accounts of consciousness. 
For example, interpretationism and conceptual role semantics, which were designed with atti-
tudes in mind, are nonstarters as accounts of underived intentionality. They are not candidate 
explanations of consciousness on the PURE view. But some theories of content could con-
ceivably explain underived intentionality, for example, causal and/or informational theories. 
More importantly, any complete theory of intentionality should explain underived intentional-
ity. This means that any complete theory of intentionality should by itself explain conscious-
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ness if the PURE view is correct. On the PURE theory, there are no special ingredients which 
turn intentional states into experiences: all there is to consciousness is the most basic kind of 
intentionality. 
Having said this, there is at least one way the strong derivation thesis suggested by the 
PURE theory could be used as part of an argument against reductionism: someone who holds 
that consciousness is irreducible could use this thesis to argue that all forms of intentionality 
are irreducible, thereby consolidating the anti-reductionist position. The PURE theory does 
not purport to settle the debate between reductionists and anti-reductionists, but it could in 
principle provide each camp with novel premises to draw on. 
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1 Dretske's proposal is also that experiences are abstract, nonconceptual and poised states, but he 
explains these conditions differently. According to him, a nonconceptual state is one that has its 
“indicator function” in virtue of natural selection (as opposed to some other kind of selection). 
Poised states are states which are prone to impact on belief (unlike Tye, Dretske does not say 
where they arise). 
2 This is also suggested by cases of anosognosia like that described in Venneri & Shanks (2004). 
For more detailed criticisms of the PANIC theory, see Byrne (2003), Kriegel (2002), Seager 
(1999, 2003), and Seager & Bourget (2007).
3 Alternatively, we could say that a representation is derived just in case it is such as to always ob-
tain at least in part in virtue of distinct intentional states, or relations to such states. In this paper I 
use “obtains in virtue of” and “is realized by” interchangeably. 
4 One might think that all the examples of derived states in this section are derived through com-
position. This is compatible with everything I say here, as one state can derive from other states 
in more than one way. 
5 Matched states don't have to be narrow. Likewise, matching states don't have to be wide. I only 
use the narrow / wide distinction to illustrate the matching / matched distinction. Note also that I  
speak of matching and matched states, as opposed to matching and matched contents of a single 
state. There are states with both matched and matching contents (we can slice and recombine in-
tentional states as much as we want, as long as the resulting states involve intentional directed-
ness among other things). However, the simplest states are those with a single content. I focus on 
those because states with distinct matching and matched contents would automatically be de-
rived on my definition (they would be composite states), so they are of little interest here. 
6 A possible objection here is that a phenomenal state s entails any state expressible as “being in s 
or ___”, so not all phenomenal states can occur independently of all other possible intentional 
states. I am not convinced that we should count disjunctive states as intentional, but I can grant 
this for the sake of argument. We need only qualify the previous claim: all phenomenal states can 
occur independently of all other phenomenal states they do not realize. This is enough to show 
that all phenomenal states are underived, because realization is anti-symmetric. 
7 Heck (2000) does not gloss the state view as being that experiences are necessarily realized by 
concepts, but only as the view that experiences depend on concepts. I make it stronger out of 
charity to potential objectors to the PURE theory. Otherwise, another reply one could make to 
the objection that the PURE theory is incompatible with conceptualism is that dependency does 
not entail realization. 
8 All the examples of presentations Brentano gives are conscious states: “By presentation I do not 
mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a 
colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of 
what I mean by this term.” (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, L. McAlister, Ed. Excerpt 
from Chalmers 2002, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, p. 479.) 
9 “We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without 
the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. Thus in the presence of 
my table I am acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my table—its col-
our, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc.; all these are things of which I am immediately conscious 
when I am seeing and touching my table.” (Ten Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University 
Press, 1973, p. 25.) 
10 It has mental states (or would if it existed) because intentional states are a species of mental state 
on the definition I gave in introduction. 
11 Thanks to David Chalmers and Heather Logue for emphasizing this objection.
12 This objection was pointed out to me by Ben Blumson, David Chalmers, Farid Masrour, and 
Amie Thomasson. 
13 Searle (1983) might be taken to be doing this. He claims that perceptual content is determined 
both by phenomenology and background beliefs and abilities. But this point does not bear on ex-
periences per se. For if perceptual content is something more than experience (as the point im-
plies), then its being derived does not imply that experience is derived. Searle at best gives us 
reason to distinguish experiential content from what he describes as perceptual content. 
14 This suggests another objection to originality: it might seem that total experiences like o are de-
rived through composition from their “components”. In response to this, the relation between 
total experiences and their so-called components is arguably like that between an experience of a 
red square and the experiences of redness and squareness: total experiences are determinates of 
their components (their determinables). Determinables do not realize their determinates. For ex-
ample, the property of being moderately tall does not realize the property of being exactly six 
foot tall. So the components of total experiences do not realize them. Also, if one insists that de-
terminables at least sometimes realize their determinates, we can amend the definition of “under-
ived” to allow for this, since realization by determinables would seem entirely different from 
other kinds of realization. 
15 See Prinz (2002) for a recent introduction to these classic problems, and potential solutions.
16 Rosenthal (1986) makes a similar point, albeit in a different context. 
